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EMISSION-OFFSET BANKING: ACCOMMODATING
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH WITH AIR-QUALITY
STANDARDS
Although most everyone, including economists, has traditionally
viewed the air we breathe as a "free good," 1 polluted air may soon
become a high-priced commodity. Already, advertisements like the
following appear in the financial press:
For Sale: Substantial Hydrocarbon Emission Offset in the
Chicago area. For details, contact Box EZ-300, Wall Street
Journal.2
This advertisement was placed by a woodfinishing plant whose im-
pending dosing would reduce air pollution in Chicago by about
1600 tons of emissions per year. It has been estimated that this
reduction may be worth as much as $3000 per ton to a buyer desir-
ing to construct or expand an industry in Chicago.3
Such large-scale trading is the result of the "offset policy" intro-
duced in 1976 4 by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as
part of a steadily increasing federal effort to balance stringent air-
pollution control with the need for continued industrial growth.5
Under this policy, when EPA determines that the air quality in a
particular region is below acceptable standards, additional polluters
are barred, making it extremely difficult for industries to construct
new plants or expand existing ones in that area. If a company,
however, is able to "offset" the pollution from its proposed plant-
for example, by paying for improved controls on existing plants in
the area or by purchasing an old facility like the woodfinishing
plant above and shutting it down-the air-pollution level would
remain constant, and the EPA would permit the new plant to open.
1 Comment, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset Concept and Its Impli-
cations, 9 ENVT'L L. 575, 589 (1979).
2 MoTRM JoNs, Nov. 1979, at 12.
3Id.
4 Air Quality Standards; Interpretative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976),
revised at 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.B. § 51) [herein-
after cited as 1976 Offset Ruling].
5 Kramer, The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Retreat From the
Technology-Forcing Strategy?, 15 Uim. L. ArrNN. 103, 120 n.83 (1978); Comment,
.supra note 1, at 578.
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This policy of accommodation 6 has been considerably expanded
in the Emission Offset Ruling,7 promulgated 8 in January, 1979,
which permits existing sources actually to "bank" offsets for future
use or sale. Thus, sources which do not merely attain but actually
reduce their emissions below an assigned maximum are permitted
to "bank" the difference between their new output level and the
required level.9 The 1979 offset ruling would permit these sources
to save their offsets in a state-administered "account" 10 despite the
agency's original conviction that such offsets should be turned im-
mediately to productive uses, creating jobs, rather than be stored
"idly." 11
EPA's about-face with regard to offset banking greatly enhances
the prospect for a fully developed emissions-rights market in which
offsets are bought and sold or sometimes held for speculation. 12
Unfortunately, the 1979 ruling does not explain why the agency's
original concerns have been allayed. After describing the banking
policy in detail in part I, this Comment will consider some of these
concerns in part II. By identifying the potential pitfalls of offset
banking, the remainder of the Comment shows the importance of
determining the precise legal status of offsets. The Comment will
finally suggest, in part IV(C), that, rather than being treated as
purely private or purely public property, emission offsets should be
treated as licenses in a manner roughly analogous to the treatment
of the public airwaves. Such an analysis provides a legal frame-
work, where none now exists, for dealing with offsets in an effective
and principled fashion.
6 Examples of major offset transactions under the 1976 Offset Ruling are docu-
mented in Comment, supra note 1, at 593-94.
744 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 51) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 Offset Ruling]. The details of the revised ruling are canvassed fully
in Raffle, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Non-attainment Under the
Clean Air Act, 10 ENviR. REP. (BNA), Monograph No. 27 (1979). This new ruling
reverses the position taken in 1976. See 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,529.
8 The revisions to the offset policy were published as an interpretative ruling.
The Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n. (MCA) has brought suit against EPA, claiming
that the new offset policy is not simply a revision of an interpretative ruling but
rather is a policy revision which requires a notice-and-comment period under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See Record, Manufacturing
Chemists Ass'n v. EPA, No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir., filed Jan. 29, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as MCA Record].
9 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,285.
10 Id.
11 See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
12 See J. QuARTEs, FEDERAL REGuIATihr OF NEW INDUSThIAL PLANTS 73 (1979);
Comment, supra note 1, at 594 & 595 n.110.
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I. THE GENESIS OF THE EMISSION-OFFSET RULING AND
OFFSET BANKING
A. The Offset Policy Takes Shape
Under the Clean Air Act,13 primary responsibility for attain-
ment of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) 14 resides
with the states, which are required to develop separate State Imple-
mentation Plans (SIPs) setting the control strategies to reduce air
pollution.15 Among other things, the SIPs are to specify the per-
missible levels of pollution that stationary sources may emit '0 and
to designate air quality control regions (AQCRs) in which those
limits will apply.17 The control strategies provide for reduction of
overall pollution levels or of the rate of pollution output sufficient
to meet the NAAQS within statutory deadlines. 18
When the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were enacted,' 9
the principal concern was the protection of public health against
high concentrations of air pollution.20 Expecting great progress in
a short time, Congress set 1975 as the deadline for attainment of the
NAAQS. By 1975, however, it was evident that Congress had been
overly optimistic. The steel industry, for example, had no plants
in compliance with the pollution-control requirements by that
time.21 Over fifty cities exceeded the NAAQS for carbon monox-
ide; indeed, many had violations for several types of pollutants at
once.22 Clearly, it would have been impossible for all AQCRs to
'. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. 1 1977).
24 NAAQSs have been established for the following pollutants: sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons (a precursor to photochemical oxi-
dants), particulate matter, and lead. See 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1978).
15 Clean Air Act §§ 107 & 110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407 & 7410 (Supp. I 1977).
New or extensively modified sources of air pollution are also required to meet federal
new source performance standards (NSPS), expressed in terms of the results achiev-
able by using the best available technology. Id. § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
1Id. § 110(a)(2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (B).
17 Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407.
18 The new deadline for attaining primary NAAQSs is December, 1982, for
some pollutants, and December, 1987, for others. Id. § 172(a)(1) & (2), 42
U.S.C. §7502(a)(1) & (2).
39 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
20 Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
21 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11, -eprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1289-90.
22 Id. 207-08, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1286-87 (quoting from
letter from EPA Administrator Train to Sen. Muskie). Even as late as 1978, many,
if not most, areas of the country which had been in violation of some standard
were still considered nonattainment areas. For example, of 105 urban areas with a
population greater than 200,000, 103 were in violation of the NAAQSs for photo-
chemical oxidants. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962-63 (1978).
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meet the statutory deadlines. Under the 1970 amendments, how-
ever, failure to attain NAAQS by 1975 meant that permits to con-
struct new or modified sources could no longer issue.23  The
potential for severe economic and social disruptions was great,
especially because industrial expansion in the nation's principal
industrial centers could have been halted altogether.
24
EPA finally responded in 1976 by promulgating its Air Quality
Standards Interpretative Ruling,2 which supplied a means of per-
mitting new growth while theoretically assuring eventual attain-
ment. The ruling established a permit requirement and provided
that "major" 26 new or modified sources, 27 which would cause or
aggravate violations of NAAQS in a nonattainment area, would be
granted permits to operate only if they met several specific con-
ditions,28 one of which bears directly on the issue of emission-offset
23 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(4) (Supp. 11977).
24 See Rosenberg & Friedman, Air Quality and Industrial Growth: The Location
of New Industrial Sources of Pollution in Non-Attainment Areas, 11 NATr. REsouRcEs
LAw. 523, 523-24 (1978).
25 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,524.
26 Of course, the definition of "major source" is crucial. The 1979 offset
ruling purports to adopt the statutory definition, Clean Air Act § 302(j), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7602 (Supp. I 1977), and thus includes as "major sources" all those with "potential
emissions of 100 tons or more per year." 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,276
(emphasis added). Although the ruling invites further comment, it strongly favors
classifying sources on the basis of their total emissions before the application of
control equipment, id., thus significantly increasing the number of industries subject
to the permit requirements. However, EPA's interpretation of the term "potential
emissions" as meaning "uncontrolled emissions" was recently rejected by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, No. 78-1006, slip
op. at 24-31 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Leventhal, J.), in which the agency's
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) regulations for attainment areas were
extensively reviewed. "Potential," the court said, refers to the amount of emissions
after the installation of pollution-control facilities. Although the decision does not
bear directly on offset regulations, the fact that the offset regulations were expressly
modeled after the PSD regulations suggests that an effect of Alabama Power may
be to reduce the number of "major sources" subject to EPA's permit requirements
in nonattainment areas.
At the same time, however, the court insisted that any modifications of such
major sources which had the effect of increasing net pollution, no matter how
slightly, were subject to PSD regulations. Again, this verdict will probably be
applied in the nonattainment context as well because "modification" is defined
similarly for both attainment and nonattainment areas. See Clean Air Act § 171(4),
42 U.S.C. §7501(4) (Supp. 1 1977).
27 For a discussion of the controversy over defining a "source," see Comment,
supra note 1, at 583.
2
8In addition to obtaining offsets, as described in the text, the new or modified
source was required to meet standards for the lowest achievable emission rate
(LAER), which was defined as either the most stringent emission limitation con-
tained in the SIP of any state for the same type of source or the most stringent
limitation achieved in practice by that type of source, whichever is more stringent.
1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,528. Second, the new-source applicant had
to certify that "all existing sources owned or controlled by the owner or operator
of the proposed source in the same AQCR as the proposed source are in compliance
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banking. The permit applicant was required to obtain offsets from
existing sources in the area sufficient to exceed the amount of
emissions that would be produced by the new or modified source. 29
The critical feature of offsets was that they were required to repre-
sent emission reductions beyond those required of the parent source
under the SIP.30 Because these offsets were unanticipated, their
use would not interfere with the scheduled attainment of NAAQS.
In addition, something greater than a one-to-one exchange of off-
setting reductions for usable offsets was necessary, so that the
transaction would represent "reasonable progress." 31 Another limi-
tation was that the offset could be applied only to the same type
of air pollution: a reduction in sulfur-dioxide emissions, for
example, could not offset a new emission of nitrogen dioxides.
32
Therefore, if the locality of a proposed new plant was a non-
attainment area for two or more pollutants, then intrapollutant
offsets would have to be obtained for each.
The offsets could be produced in several ways. If an owner
wished to expand his plant, he could install tighter controls on his
existing operations, perhaps including use of innovative technology
or controls so costly that they were not mandated by the SIP.
Alternatively, the owner of the proposed source could pay the cost
of taking extra pollution-control measures at a neighboring plant.
In some cases, an applicant could purchase an existing facility and
close it down. Smaller quantities of offsets could be generated by
using less contaminating substances on jobs such as road paving or
with all applicable SIP requirements." Id. 55,529. Third, the required emission
offsets must have provided for a "net air quality benefit" in the area. Id. This
requirement essentially restricts the geographic origin of offsets because, for example,
sulfur dioxide does not disperse well, reduction in its emission at one spot within
a nonattainment area would not necessarily compensate for an increase in emissions
when the new source is constructed some distance away. To provide air quality
benefit, such offsetting reductions will most likely have to come from an existing
plant very near the proposed source. In contrast, highly volatile contaminants such
as hydrocarbons, which disperse easily, could be obtained from anywhere "in the
broad vicinity" of the new source. See J. QuAnrxs, supra note 12, at 76. Finally,
the 1976 ruling provided that construction was impermissible in any area for which
an SIP had not been approved by EPA. 1976 Offset Ruling, supra at 55,529. All
except the last condition were carried over into the 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note
7, at 3,284.
29 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,529.
30 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
31 Thus, five tons of unrequired reduction might translate into four tons of
bankable offset. Exactly what ratio would be applied was left to the individual
states: "As long as the emission offset is greater than one-for-one, . . . EPA does
not intend to question a reviewing authority's judgment as to what constitutes
reasonable progress." 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,529-30.
32 Id. 55,529.
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painting. Likewise, pollution could be abated through better
maintenance, such as more frequent valve inspections.33
Congress expressly approved EPA's offset scheme when it
amended the Clean Air Act in 1977. 84 The task of administering
the permit system and applying the agency's offset conditions fell
to the states, 35 but until their SIPs were revised, EPA's 1976 ruling
was to remain in effect.38
B. The No-Banking Provision
EPA initially disposed of the banking issue, with which this
Comment is principally concerned, in a summary fashion. The 1976
ruling stated, "Once an emission offset has been executed .... there
can be no leftover credit to 'bank' for additional new source growth
in the future." 37 This meant that any emission-offset arrangement
had to involve contemporaneous reductions and construction and
that emission reductions in excess of those required as offsets for a
specific new source forever lost their value as offsets. Thus, for
example, if existing source A reduced its pollution by 150 units in
order to offset new source B's emissions of only 100 units, fifty units
of offset capacity would be lost if not immediately assigned to a
specific use by another new or modified source. Such excessive re-
ductions could occur when, for instance, estimations of offset avail-
ability proved inaccurate, or when technologies of scale allowed
only larger than needed offsets.
38
Although EPA defended its no-banking rule by suggesting that
a pro-banking rule would be "inconsistent with a basic policy of
the [Clean Air] Act" 39 and would create difficult "accounting
problems," 40 the agency did not elaborate on this position. EPA
seems to have been concerned primarily with the situation in which
an existing source reduces emissions beyond SIP requirements but
33 See Comment, supra note 1, at 580.
34 Note accompanying Clean Air Act § 12 9(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I
1977).
351d. § 702(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (Supp. 11977).
361d. § 129(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. 11977).
87 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,529.
38 Pollution-abatement techniques tend to have a step-like function. Reductions
cannot or tend not to be in discrete increments. It may, for example, be necessary
to cut emissions by 100 tons in order to achieve a 50-ton reduction because it is
not efficient to make a smaller reduction. See Memorandum from J. Fitzgerald to
C. Wasserman (Nov. 15, 1977) (available at EPA Public Information Reference
Unit, Washington, D.C.).
39 1976 Offset Ruling, supra note 4, at 55,526.
40 W. Barber & D. Hawkins, "Banking" Under the Emission Offset Interpreta-
tive Ruling (internal EPA memorandum) (Nov. 8, 1977) (available at EPA Public
Information Reference Unit, Washington, D.C.).
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then "sits on" the offsets until it might want to use them. To the
extent that the offset policy was a response to the economic stag-
nation which private industry had accused environmentalists of
aggravating, it seemed only proper to insist that such offsets be used
immediately to stimulate jobs.41 Beyond consideration of this
factor, EPA's initial evaluation of emission banking may have been
fairly cursory.
C. EPA Reverses Itself
In the period following promulgation of the 1976 ruling, EPA
received numerous comments on it-primarily from industry 4-and
spent considerable time reevaluating it. By the time the agency
issued its revised ruling in 1979, it had completely reversed its posi-
tion.43  The agency acknowledged that the "'no-banking' rule
would have an adverse air-quality impact (at least in the short term)
by discouraging early clean-up of sources" 44 beyond what was spe-
cifically required by the SIP. EPA realized that, without banking,
sources would be inclined to maintain obsolete, highly polluting
facilities simply to preserve potential emission reductions for use as
future offsets. Alternatively, a source might delay adding pollution-
abatement equipment to its facilities until it or some new source
actually needed to use the offsets. These arguments had appeared
frequently among the public comments received by EPA.45 More-
over, it had been suggested that the existence of offset inventories
would assist industries in engaging in long-range planning and
enable new-source applicants more easily to locate usable offsets
for sale.
46
In effect, banking provides incentives which would not neces-
sarily generate more offsets in the long run 47 but would encourage
4 1 Interview with D.K. Berry, EPA Office of Air Quality and Standards (Aug.
1979) (notes on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
42 See MCA Record, supra note 8: illustrative are the comments in the record
from ARCO Chemical Co. (Oct. 17, 1978); Dow Chemical (Mar. 14, 1979); and
Tenneco Chemicals (Mar. 6, 1979).
43 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,280. In its preamble to the revision,
EPA briefly cited the reasons for its original opposition: "[Ilt was felt that banking
would create a difficult accounting problem, probably would not result in any
environmental benefit, and tended to dilute the potential benefits of the offset policy."
Id.
44Id.
45 See note 42 supra.
46 See J. Hoffman, Economic Advantages of Emissions Banking Systems (EPA
Office of Planning and Management, No. 79-54.7) (undated).
47 Over a long period of time, pollution controls might be equally spurred by
discouraging reliance on an assumption that offsets will be obtainable in the market-
place and forcing new-source applicants to initiate pollution-control measures at
existing plants.
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more firms to produce them as quickly as possible. Without bank-
ing, only those firms contemplating imminent expansion or con-
struction of new sources would be alert to possible conservation
measures and motivated to invest in research for the development
of better pollution controls. With banking, all existing sources can
hold offsets for sale to the highest bidders, encouraging them to
find untapped opportunities for emission abatement. Banking thus
seems consistent with the "technology-forcing" strategy underlying
the Clean Air Act.
48
The consistency of banking with the Clean Air Act, however,
is by no means a settled question. After all, Congress gave blanket
approval to the 1976 offset ruling which had prohibited banking.
49
The 1977 amendments to the Act provided, though, that the offset
policy was to be followed "as may be modified by rule of the
Administrator," 50 implying that EPA had authority to alter its
stance on banking at its discretion. Moreover, the change to bank-
ing seems at first glance harmonious with Congress's own shift of
policy toward accommodating the needs and concerns of industry.51
The 1977 amendments still require attainment of relatively stringent
abatement standards, but Congress has retreated from favoring
abatement at virtually any technological or economic Cost 2 to
recognizing the need to encourage strengthening of the economy.5
To this end, Congress introduced slack and flexibility into the
pollution-reduction program, principally through approval of the
48For a close look at this strategy, see Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean
Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979). One impediment to progress,
according to the author, is the tendency of industries to concentrate too much on
development of new-process technology, applicable only to new plants, and not
enough on developing controls for installation at existing plants. Id. 1721 & n.42.
To the extent banking gives existing plants an incentive to overcontrol their emis-
sions beyond SIP requirements, the new policy may correct this imbalance.
49Note accompanying Clean Air Act § 129(a), 42 U.S.C. §7502 (Supp. I
1977). This section of the statute sets forth the SIP requirements for state pro-
grams; the note indicates that the 1976 ruling is to apply until the states comply.
That ruling, however, never authorized banking. See text accompanying note 37
supra.
50Note accompanying Clean Air Act § 129(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I
1977).
5 1 See note 5 supra & accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Note, Economic and Technological Feasibility Under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, 51 Nom DAm LAw. 849, 852-54 (1976); Note,
Considerations of Technological and Economic Factors in Air Pollution Control, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 573, 588-90 (1975).
53 H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1289.
[Vol. 128:937
EMISSION-OFFSET BANKING
emission-offset provisions. Banking is simply another step in the
same direction.
The 1979 offset ruling overstates the case, though, when it
claims that banking was specifically endorsed by the 1977 amend-
ments; indeed, the term does not appear anywhere in the statute.
According to EPA, Congress modified the "no-banking provision"
in the 1976 ruling "by allowing States to incorporate provisions for
growth in SIP plans for non-attainment areas." 5- Although no
citation is given, the allusion seems to be to section 173(l)(B),55
which the legislative history reveals was viewed by conferees as an
alternative procedure to the emission-offset analysis.50 The "allow-
ance for growth" scheme permits states to establish SIP limitations
more rigorous than necessary to achieve national ambient air quality
standards, resulting in a cushion for growth which the state can
allocate to new sources "without case-by-case offset determina-
tions." 57 Such a scheme is clearly distinguishable from the one
permitted by EPA's new ruling whereby individual firms voluntarily
produce excess reductions and bank them in a state registry for
their own future use or for sale to others at a profit.
The concept of emission offsets was endorsed by Congress in
the alternative paragraph of section 173(1). Indeed, the 1979 offset
ruling states that "[u]nder section 173(1) of the Act, emission re-
ductions are compared to a 'reasonable further progress' goal, and
reductions beyond the minimum requirement may be used to offset
future growth." 18 Although the provision cited does establish
54 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,280.
55 The section reads, in pertinent part:
The permit program required by section 7502(b) (6) of this title shall pro-
vide that permits to construct and operate may be issued if-
(1) the permitting agency determines...
(B) that emissions of such pollutant resulting from the proposed
new or modified major stationary source will not cause or con-
tribute to emissions levels which exceed the allowance permitted
for such pollutant for such area from new or modified major
stationary sources.
Clean Air Act §173(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §7503(1)(B) (Supp. I 1977). See
J. QuAntas, supra note 12, at 67-68; Rosenberg & Friedman, supra note 24, at
554-55.
56 See H.R. REP. No. 95-564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1502, 1537.
57 123 CONG. BEc. S. 13702 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
58 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,280.
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"reasonable further progress" as the standard for evaluating off-
sets, it nowhere says that reductions beyond the minimum SIP
limits can be used to permit future growth.59 The ability in the
first instance to make use of offsets does not necessarily imply the
right to bank those offsets; at least, this is not self-evident. In short,
EPA has read paragraph (A) of section 173(1), authorizing offsets,
and paragraph (B), authorizing banking, as complementary despite
their separation by the word "or." In a sense, Congress's willing-
ness, in effect, to let the states bank offsets under paragraph (B) sup-
ports the inference that it saw nothing wrong with banking per se.
If this view is taken, however, the same provision would seem to
suggest Congress's unwillingness to confer blanket power on private
sources to bank at will, reserving that power to environmental
authorities instead.
EPA's 1979 offset ruling places no such restriction on the im-
plementation of banking. Indeed, the ruling does little to outline
exactly how a banking policy should function if a state chooses to
adopt it. 0 Although a state would become the "banker," it is un-
clear if this word is intended to connote ownership or merely
supervision. In fact, no precise answer is given to the question of
who will own the offsets produced in excess of SIP requirements;
instead, this is a matter to be decided by each state, which is "free
to govern ownership, use, sale, and commercial transactions in
banked emission offsets as it sees fit." -1 What little concrete guid-
ance EPA offers certainly leaves open to the states the option of
treating offsets as purely private property.
62
5 9 Clean Air Act § 173(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977), reads
in pertinent part:
The permit program . . . shall provide that permits to construct and
operate may be issued if-
(1) the permitting agency determines that-
(A) by the time the source is to commence operation, total allow-
able emissions . . . in the region . . . [including those from the
proposed source] will be sufficiently less than total emissions from
existing sources allowed under the applicable implementation plan
prior to the application for such permit . . . so as to represent
... reasonable further progress.
60 Under the ruling, states are free to adopt banking, but are not required to
do so. 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,280.
61Id.
62 "The reviewing authority should provide a registry to identify the person,
private entity, or governmental authority that has the right to use or allocate the
banked emission reductions, and to record any transfers of, or liens on, this right that
the reviewing authority may allow." Id.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The precise legal characteristics of emission offsets have only
begun to be analyzed 63 despite the important consequences which
their legal classification has for the implementation of offset bank-
ing. Emission offsets fall into one of three possible categories. At
one extreme, they can be considered the exclusive property of the
parent source which produced them. Alternatively, at the other
extreme, offsets can be treated as public property, even though
private investments are usually responsible for their creation.
Finally, offsets can be viewed not so much as physicial entities but
rather as legal instruments, awarded to private investors in pollution
control, which indicate the availability of certain amounts of air for
private consumption subject, however, to terms and conditions set
by the government.
A. The Preference of Industry
Most of the public comments received by EPA following pro-
mulgation of the pro-banking rule advocated making offsets the
exclusive property of the parent source.64  The commentators-
primarily industrial concerns-felt that it would be unfair to deprive
a private company of ownership when it had spent money to pro-
duce the offset, and that to do so would eliminate the incentive to
produce offsets, thus defeating the purpose of the ruling. Offset
banking, it was argued, should operate in a manner akin to the
banking of any other asset. For example, the parent source would
be able to open an offset "account" with a banking authority (prob-
ably a state agency), deposit offsets into the account, and withdraw
offsets as needed.6 5 Regardless of the precise contours of such a
system, its salient feature would be that ownership itself would
confer rights to use and alienate freely one's offsets: it would grant,
in essence, a right to pollute equivalent to the size of the offset.
That right, moreover, implies the right to retain the offset for an
indefinite period before use.66
6 3 An early survey of these issues appears in Comment, supra note 1.
64 See MCA Record, supra note 8: in addition to the comments cited in note
42 supra, see also those from Independent Liquid Terminals Ass'n (ILTA) (Mar.
19, 1979) and the American Iron and Steel Institute (Mar. 15, 1979).
6 5 See, e.g., MCA Record, supra note 8: comment from Independent Liquid
Terminals Ass'n (Mar. 19, 1979), going so far as to suggest that emission "savers"
should have a right to "interest' on their banked offsets which are "loaned" to new
sources. Such a scheme would surely undermine any long-term remedial purposes
of the Clean Air Act.
66 It should be noted that the market for offsets would not diminish once com-
pliance with NAAQS is achieved; any new source to locate in the area would cause
renewed violations unless it is able to offset its emissions.
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Serious allocation problems may arise, however, from private
ownership, threatening nonattainment areas with economic stagna-
tion. Once banking removes the need for production and sale to
be contemporaneous, offset markets are subject to the dangers of
undue concentration and prolonged hoarding of offsets. Without
limits on how large a share of the regional offset supply any one
source can possess, market abuses may develop. Likewise, without
limits on how long offsets can be banked, several sources may each
"hoard" their offsets indefinitely. 7 In either case, the effect is the
same: new sources are lost for lack of needed offsets. In light of
the fundamental purpose of the offset policy-to allow industrial
growth despite stringent air-quality standards 68-such market fail-
ures should be deemed critical. Yet, perhaps because the drafters
of the Clean Air Act never contemplated offset banking and the
full-blown market it might spawn, 9 that statute confines its regula-
tion to situations in which a source seeks a permit to construct;
transactions between sources involving offsets are ignored. The
discussion which follows attempts to show that the problems of
hoarding and anticompetitive behavior, though not totally beyond
the reach of existing laws, are nonetheless acute when offsets are
privately owned. The remainder of this Comment will suggest that
the problems of "how much" and "how long" may be more satis-
factorily addressed if alternative concepts of ownership are applied.
B. The Problem of Unlimited Duration
1. The Potential for Speculation
If an existing source can legitimately hold its unused offsets
without limit, then the productive potential of the offsets is lost.
On the other hand, limited duration provides the incentive for a
source to continue its pollution-reduction programs. Knowing that
67 See text accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
68 See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-10, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1287-89:
On the one hand, protection of the public health remains the predominant
goal of the Clean Air Act. ...
On the other hand, a complete prohibition on new growth or expan-
sion in nonattainment regions would pose very serious problems.
on I]n areas of particularly high unemployment complete restric-tion of growth or expansion . . . might exaggerate unemployment or at
least hinder reemployment efforts ....
In order to reconcile these conflicting concerns, the committee adopted
section 117 [the offset provisions] of the bill.
69 See notes 49-50 supra & accompanying text.
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its offsets may expire, a source must continue to look for untapped
opportunities for emission reduction if it wishes to maintain a steady
inventory of offsets.
Allowing offsets to be banked indefinitely may encourage the
development of a speculative offset market. Brokers or companies
could buy up offsets and hold them in the hope that their value
would increase. If industrial expansion proceeds at a rate faster
than the improvement in pollution-abatement technology," 0 or if,
as one commentator suggests, "there are only so many emission
reductions that can be squeezed out of a given area," 71 then enor-
mous profits can be realized from such nonproductive activity.7 2
By the same token, given such probable scarcity, a cautious business
with visions of future expansion may jealously hold onto offsets not
for speculation but for fear that none will be available when it
wants them. Thus, it may be desirable to force parent sources
either to put their reductions to productive uses or to sell them
within a certain period of time.
2. Problems of Confiscation Under a Private-Property Model
The Clean Air Act casts a cloud over this prospect of unlimited
speculation in offsets, but the cloud derives from the ambiguity of
the Act's provisions rather than from any direct, carefully conceived
regulation.
70 Another commentator has suggested that, although the technology-forcing
strategy of the Clean Air Act generally works, several factors inherent in the law
may actually impede the development of better technology. See Note, supra note
48, at 1727-28. If this analysis is correct, it reinforces the assumption made
throughout this Comment that pollution abatement is unlikely to undergo vast im-
provement, and thus offsets will remain a scarce, valuable resource. But see note
48 supra.
71 Comment, supra note 1, at 598.
72 At least one state has structured its proposed banking scheme specifically to
exclude "middlemen" from offset trading to try to forestall the likelihood of specu-
lative investment. Pennsylvania's draft offset policy states: "Only emission offsets
that have been transferred directly from an existing source to the proposed source
will be recognized under this section. Transfer of emission offsets through inter-
mediate parties cannot be applied to meet the requirements of this section." PA.
CODE tit. 25, pt. I, § 127.66(c) (1979). The drafters "particularly wishe[d] to
avoid a situation where ... a third party buys emission offsets for financial specu-
lation and holds them indefinitely, thereby prohibiting a new source from locating
in an area and providing employment and other economic benefits to the area."
Bureau of Air Quality Control, Dep't of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Proposed Revisions to Implementation Plans: Summary of Com-
ments and Responses 5 (June 12, 1979).
By eliminating the broker-dealer, such measures may inhibit, but not necessarily
foreclose, speculative hoarding; producers of offsets would still have incentives to
hold them for future sale or use. The proposals suggested in part IV may curb
abuses more effectively without per se excluding successive offset transactions. See
text accompanying notes 103-18 infra.
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Because the Act does not explicitly authorize banking of offsets,
it is not surprising that Congress expressed no opinion about
whether offsets can be held indefinitely and, if so, how they are
affected by revisions in the SIP. Under section 173(1)(A) of the
Act, however, the amount of emission reduction that can be used
to offset a proposed new source is calculated by using the SIP base-
line in effect when the application for a permit is made 73 rather
than when the offsets are created. Tightening the SIP levels ap-
plicable to a firm thus has a confiscatory effect on any offsets not
yet used in a permit application.74 Still, such SIP revisions are
clearly authorized by statute 75 and may be necessary as compliance
deadlines draw nearer.
7 6
As a result, the statute invites suspicion that a firm's banked
reductions may be "confiscated," thus destroying the incentive for
current conservation that banking was supposed to provide. Pro-
ponents of banking have stressed that assurances against confiscation
are critical to the program's success, 77 and this need may be given
as a justification for granting offsets the status of vested property
rights. In fact, however, it is doubtful that treating offsets as private
property would necessarily dispose of the confiscation problem or
allay investors' fears. Although the law of takings resists simple
analysis, constitutional doctrine permits the confiscatory effects of
government regulation when necessary to protect public health
under the police power. 78 Tightening SIP baselines to adjust for
73 Clean Air Act § 173(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977). See
note 59 supra.
74To illustrate, suppose Firm X reduces its emissions by 10 tons per year below
the level required of it by the SIP in effect at that time. The state is using a
1.1:1 offset ratio, see note 31 supra, so the firm gets to bank 9 tons. In order to
compensate for unforeseen deterioration in air quality and enable the area still to
attain NAAQS by the statutory deadline, the state finds it necessary to revise SIP
quotas downward so that X's allowable emissions are reduced by 2 tons per year.
When X or its transferee applies for a permit, it would then receive credit for only
7 tons per year, rather than 9, because offsets are allowed only for excess reductions,
and the stricter baseline has, in effect, erased part of the excess.
75 Clean Air Act §110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(H) (Supp. I
1977).
76 State environmental authorities might have to adjust SIP quotas to compen-
sate for exemptions granted to existing sources, or to "make room" for a new indus-
trial source which local authorities have lured to their region. See Rosenberg &
Friedman, supra note 24, at 532-33 & 540-41. Revisions might also be necessitated
by inaccurate predictions or from unanticipated increases in pollution from new
non-major sources not subject to the permit-requirement process and, therefore, not
within the state agency's power to control.
77 EPA OFFIcE oF PLANNqNG & MANAGEMENT, PLANNING FOR CLEAN Ai & A
STRONG ECONOMY 9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PLANNwNG]; see J. Hoffman, supra
note 46, at 6.
78 Despite claims by owners that the economic value of their land had been
totally destroyed, noxious uses of property were not protected from confiscation in
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unanticipated increases in pollution would thereby seem a legitimate
exercise of police power. At most, treating offsets as private property
might assure owners "equal protection"; 79 that is, emissions from
existing sources would have to be reduced by the same percentage
at which banked offsets are discounted, equalizing the impact on
bankers and non-bankers. Conceivably, too, offset holders might
further argue that offsets, unlike land, have only one use and that,
therefore, deprivation comes within the category of "total destruc-
tions" for which compensation may be allowed.8 0
Allowing notions of private-property rights to plant such ob-
stacles in the path of SIP revisions would seriously impair the
statutory powers of state environmental authorities. Creators and
purchasers of offsets must be put on notice that banked reductions
may be discounted. The law should, however, attempt to minimize
the uncertainty created in the offset market by the possibility of
confiscation. To the extent SIP baselines can change at any time,
businesses may find it too risky to produce and hold onto offsets,
and the potential benefits to the economy of a banking program
will not be realized."' Treating offsets as private property does not,
as we have seen, solve this problem.82
C. Antitrust Problems
The discussion of hoarding in the previous section assumed a
competitive market in which offsets are held by several sources.
Because of the probable scarcity of offsets, however, they may be
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sand- and gravel-mining
operation prohibited by zoning amendment); Hadacbeck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (brickyard closed without compensation because it endangered health of
city population growing around it). See generally L. Tamz, AMztxcaN CoNsTr=--
TzAL LAw 459-63 (1978).
79 On the "equal protection dimensions of compensation law," see Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149, 169-71 (1971).
80 See L. TninE, supra note 78, at 460; cf. Mandelker & Sherry, Emission Quota
Strategies as an Air Pollution Control Technique, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 418-19
(1976) (restraints imposed on the private use of land by emissions quotas may be
so total as to constitute a "taking" of the land).
81 Consider, for example, the potential disincentive to offset creation and bank-
ing contained in the following section of Pennsylvania's new offset procedure: "In
the event new regulations are established under this title, emission offsets from
sources covered by the new regulations will not be allowed in the consideration of
a plan approval application from the date the Environmental Quality Board adopts
such new regulations:' PA. CoDE tit 25, pt. I, § 127.66(b) (1979). The plain
language of the rule seems to suggest the erasure of all accumulated offsets in the
event of any change in the regulations covering the parent source, though it is
difficult to see why such possibly drastic consequences would be necessary in every
case.
82 For a proposed solution involving a grant of temporary rights to offsets, see
text accompanying notes 112-19 infra.
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collected by a single source or cartel of sources, in which case
various antitrust considerations will arise.8 3 The geographic con-
straints on the relevant market and the requirement that offset
exchanges be intrapollutant s4 further limits the number of poten-
tial sellers in any one nonattainment area. Because industrial
growth in such areas is contingent upon finding sufficient offsets to
meet pennit conditions, much market power devolves upon those
firms able to gain possession of substantial offsets. The potential
effect on prices could be undesirable. Moreover, in areas with a
concentration of similar sources, such as auto plants or steel mills,
there could even exist the possibility of collusive behavior among
competitors to benefit themselves and disadvantage an excluded
competitor.
A truly free market in emission offsets may, therefore, have to
rely significantly on effective enforcement of antitrust laws to ensure
competition. A look at specific scenarios illustrates the extent to
which antitrust analysis can help resolve the problems.
Assume that a particular firm is the sole major source of a
certain pollutant within a given nonattainment area and is able to
reduce its emissions such that a significant volume of offsets is pro-
duced. The firm thus enjoys a virtual monopoly in that category
of pollutant. This position as such almost certainly violates no
law: monopoly power resulting from the exclusive, fortuitous owner-
ship of a scarce resource is not illegal.8 5 It would, in fact, be con-
trary to the purposes of the banking policy to punish the firm for
having produced so many offsets. Under circumstances in which
the monopoly is a natural and legal consequence, antitrust law by
itself, divorced from public-utility regulation, is relatively powerless
to control prices.8 6 Such a monopolist is not, however, in a position
to discriminate unfairly among purchasers of a scarce resource and
thus effectively admit some firms, but not others, into a nonattain-
ment area.
87
83 See J. Hoffman, supra note 46, at 5.
84 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
85 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (dictum);
L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOx OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST §§ 33-39 (1977).
86 See id. § 47(b).
87 For instance, in United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S.
383 (1912), the Supreme Court found illegal under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976), an arrangement whereby the only railroad bridge across the Missis-
sippi River at St. Louis, among other properties, had come under the ownership of
a single company, and those needing to use the bridge were given access on a dis-
criminatory basis so as to restrain competition among affected rail carriers. See also
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When market dominance in offsets arises, not naturally by re-
duction of one's own emissions, but rather by purchase of others'
offsets beyond one's reasonably foreseeable needs, then antitrust law
may be able to cure the resulting anticompetitive effects on offset
prices and entry of competing firms. Proof of specific intent to
monopolize may not be necessary in every case. 8
Finally, consider situations in which two or more sources might
unite in their control of offsets. The formation of a price-fixing
cartel would clearly be per se illegal.8 9 Also, if the sources jointly
refuse to sell to a purchaser in order to restrain competition, they
would likely be subject to suit for illegal boycotting.90 Whether
the law would permit a joint agency for selling offsets, whereby the
holders in an area appoint an exclusive agent to sell their offsets
for them, would probably depend very much on the circumstances
of each case.91
As the preceding examples suggest, antitrust law would provide
remedies for blatantly anticompetitive conduct by offset bankers.
The monopolistic effects of a self-generated abundance of offsets
may not, however, be as easily remedied. Moreover, it is quite
possible that conduct similar to the extreme examples discussed, but
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Gamco, Inc. v. Provi-
dence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
817 (1952).
88 Having deliberately achieved control over all the offsets in an AQCR, a firm
may be found to have illegally monopolized, "however innocently it otherwise
proceed~s],' just by virtue of its ultimate control over the market. United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). If it can bo-
shown that the firm intends to gain monopoly power and exclude competitors from
the area, then the firm's acquisition activity would clearly fall under the proscription
against "attempt[s] to monopolize" in section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976). See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349
(D. Mass. 1953). In addition, decisions punishing speculators who corner the mar-
ket in commodities so as to reap the profits from inflated prices should be equally
applicable to dealers speculating in offsets. Cf. Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th
Cir. 1938) (corn futures).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
9 0 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
91 See generally L. SusLrvAN, supra note 85, at § 104. For instance, in Appa-
lachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), a group of coal producers,
controlling about 73% of the output in their area, created a joint agency for selling
their coal. Even though the agency went so far as to set prices for the coal sold,
the Court applied a "rule of reason" and found that, given the very unstable condi-
tions of the market and the industry, the arrangement was not an unreasonable
restraint of trade. By way of contrast, when a group of excelsior producers made
an exclusive sales-agency agreement that, among other things, set the price at
which their product was sold, the court held the combination per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir.
1958).
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with fewer clear indicia of anticompetitive purpose or effect, would
be not only harder to detect but also less amenable to antitrust
prosecution. The sheer length and complexity of much antitrust
litigation 92 could negate the realistic value of the remedy. Further-
more, antitrust law neglects interests unconnected with competitive
considerations. Other pressing public interests, such as employment
or tax-base maximization, may dictate that even natural monopolies
in offsets be compelled to divest their holdings or have their selling
prices approved, so that offsets may be converted to productive use.
In short, some type of regulatory framework, removing offsets from
solely private ownership, may be needed if society is to reap the
full benefits of an offset-banking policy instead of just preventing
the blatant abuses.
III. THE PUBLIC-PROPERTY ALTERNATIVE
One alternative to the vested-property-rights theory is to require
that all excess reductions which a parent source creates, but cannot
presently use or sell, revert automatically to the public domain.
This scheme would remove bankable offsets from private hands alto-
gether and give environmental authorities ultimate power over their
allocation.93 Although this arrangement might eliminate many of
the problems associated with private ownership, it would also sig-
nificantly undermine the private incentives to overcontrol which
banking was designed to support.94  If polluting sources are unable
to profit from (or at least recover the cost of) pollution abatement
beyond that required by the SIP, they would produce offsets far
more slowly, or not at all. The stimulus to cut emissions would
have to come from the SIP in the form of tighter restrictions de-
92 See, e.g., P. AnEEDA & D. TnuRNm, 2 AN'rrRusT LAW ff 318 (1978) ("In-
deed, the antitrust case may involve so many issues, documents, witnesses, and
lawyers as to defy comprehension."). See also L. SuLmvAs, supra note 85, at § 244.
93 In fact, some staffers at EPA apparently espoused this position during the
agency's internal policymaking discussion prior to promulgation of the original 1976
Offset Ruling:
We most strongly object to any language that implies that tradeoffs
[offsets] may be a "marketable" or "bankable" right. The policy must
make it absolutely clear that what is involved is a right of the permitting
agency to adjust the mix of emissions limitations to make room for a new
source, rather than any right of a source to pollute up to SIP levels. We
object to any language which explicitly sanctions the creation of a free
market for buying and selling the right to pollute, even if the creation of
such a market is left to the discretion of the reviewing agency.
Memorandum from S. Legro, Enforcement Division, to EPA Deputy Director (Dec.
1, 1976) (emphasis added), included in MCA Record, supra note 8. Needless to
say, EPA ultimately ignored this advice by approving both the banking and mar-
keting of emission offsets.
94 See text accompanying notes 44 & 45 supra.
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signed to reduce pollution below the federally mandated standards,
creating a cushion for growth which the state might then allocate
to applicants at its discretion.
Tightening the SIP would be perhaps even more consistent
with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 15 than the emission-
offset banking introduced by EPA. 6 It would correspond to one
of the two alternative procedures Congress granted the states for
determining whether new growth would be permitted in a non-
attainment area. Indeed, section 173(l)(B) of the Act, authorizing
states to include an "allowance for growth" in their SIPs, envisions
public ownership and government allocation of pollution rights. 97
So, too, does the provision for new-source review in attainment
areas under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program,
which charges EPA and local governments with responsibility for
keeping already clean air clean by carefully distributing available
growth increments to worthy applicants.98 Although skeptics of the
"allowance for growth" procedure in nonattainment areas point to
the difficulty of mandating SIP requirements tighter than are neces-
sary to meet the national ambient air quality standards,99 it should
be apparent that the obstacles are more political than technological.
Even the offset program assumes that untapped opportunities exist
for further emission reduction beyond that required for attainment;
otherwise, the only offsets that could be created would derive from
plant shutdowns and curtailments.
A more basic objection to the "allowance for growth" scheme
is one directed at SIPs in general. One commentator has argued
that setting emission limits on source categories merely encourages
95Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§7401-7626 (Supp. I 1977)).
96 See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
9 7
The subsection reads:
The permit program required by section 7502(b)(6) of this title shall
provide that permits to construct and operate may be issued if-
(1) the permitting agency determines...
(B) that emissions of such pollutant resulting from the proposed
new or modified major stationary source will not cause or contribute to
emissions levels which exceed the allowance permitted for such pollutant
for such area from new or modified major stationary sources.
Clean Air Act §173(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §7503(l)(B) (Supp. I 1977). See J.
QuARL s, supra note 12, at 67-68; Rosenberg & Friedman, supra note 24, at 554-55.
9 8 See Clean Air Act §§ 160-169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. I 1977);
J. Qu~nrms, supra note 12, at 25-27; Raffle, supra note 7, at 47-48; Comment,
Increment Allocation Under Prevention of Significant Deterioration: How to Decide
Who Is Allowed to Pollute, 74 Nw. U. L. RBv. 937 (1980).
99 See J. QuA.LEs, supra note 12, at 68; Rosenberg & Friedman, supra note
24, at 555.
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palliative solutions and short-run fuel conversions rather than
technological innovation and truly long-term solutions.10 Tighten-
ing SIPs might simply mean more of the same. One of the virtues of
banking is that it furnishes a perpetual incentive to reduce emis-
sions, an incentive which will not disappear once a certain required
level is reached.
The more fundamental objection to the procedure contained
in section 173(l)(B), or any prescription for government ownership
and assignment of offsets, is that the optimal allocation of such
offsets can be best accomplished by private-market forces rather than
central planners.' 1' If the sum a potential user would pay is the
measure of the value to it or of the productive use it can make of a
resource, then the sale of offsets to the highest bidder will arguably
reflect their most productive use. 02 Meanwhile, the increasing
price of purchasing offsets on the open market will encourage firms
which have met SIP requirements to supply as many reductions as
technology will permit and at the same time motivate sources that
have not yet reached SIP targets to reduce their needs for offsets
through conservation.
Thus, although local governments may want to examine the
public-ownership route (specifically the statutory scheme creating
"allowance for growth" in their SIPs, authorized by Congress in
section 173(l)(B) of the Clean Air Act), this option, like private
banking of offsets, has drawbacks. Moreover, the political costs of
tightening SIPs make it a stark choice. Indeed, dissatisfaction with
both the private- and public-ownership alternatives prompts a fur-
ther search for options which would retain the advantages of price
allocation and the conservation incentives which characterize private
banking without totally sacrificing government's ability to curb
market abuse and control offset use when required by public neces-
sity. The final section of this Comment proposes a series of such
intermediate solutions.
100 See Note, supra note 48, at 1725-28.
101 See, e.g., R. PosNaE, EcoNowic ANALYSIS OF LAw § 1.2 (2d ed. 1977)
("Forced exchanges with an after-the-fact determination by the legal system as to
whether the exchanges increased or reduced efciency constitute a less efficient
mechanism for the allocation of resources than market transactions-where market
transactions are feasible.").
It is noteworthy that the Council on Wage and Price Stability has urged that
a "complete market approach" be taken to emission rights. See Comment, supra
note 1, at 595 n.110 (citing Easton & O'Donnell, The Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977: Refining the National Pollution Control Strategy, 27 J. AIR POLLTnON
CONT. A. 943, 947 (1977)).





As discussed earlier '0 3 the consequences of vesting absolute
property rights in offsets are chiefly the risk of monopolistic behavior
and the specter of offset shortages aggravated by offset holders'
unwillingness to sell. The former may be difficult to police and
the latter may not be culpable. Cautious businesses without cur-
rent plans to expand may nonetheless be reluctant to yield offsets
with the risk of being unable to repurchase them if later needed.
Other firms may simply prefer to speculate and hold out for a higher
price. Although in conventional markets such holdouts are usually
a stimulus to new competition, the finite supply of offsets weakens
this safeguard. In any case, the lack of sellers means needed source
expansion or construction in a nonattainment area may have to be
foregone. The challenge, therefore, is to protect the public interest
in having valuable emission reductions put to productive use, with-
out excessive government supervision of offset trading.
A. State Acquisition of Offsets
One possibility is for public authorities to become the sole
purchaser of reductions, thereby discouraging brokers and specu-
lators in the offset market. A public agency could then auction the
offsets or, in special circumstances, divert them to projects which
will particularly increase local employment and tax base. 04 The
problem with this solution, aside from the expense to the taxpayer,
is that the public authority would then have an economic stake in
maintaining SIP limits at their existing levels: reducing them
would, in effect, erase the government's investment in marketable
offsets. In a more philosophical vein, the cost of emission abate-
ment should properly be borne by the sources themselves, not the
taxpayer, in exchange for having placed the "externalities" of pol-
lution on the public.
Adopting EPA's banking scheme, but with a tax in kind im-
posed on reductions when created, might be a better strategy for
building a store of publicly held offsets.105 Such an assessment
would not necessarily add an administrative step to the banking
process. The levy could be made simply by setting the offset ratio
10 3 See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 83-84 supra.
304 Compare the suggestion in EPA's 1979 offset ruling that "[a] State or
community which desires that a source locate in its area may commit to reducing
emissions from existing sources . . . to sufficiently outweigh the impact of the new
source and thus open the way for the new source." 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note
7, at 3,285.
105 See PLANNc, supra note 77, at 24.
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-that is, the ratio of reductions to new emissions-at a level which
would not only ensure "reasonable further progress" (as currently
required by section 173(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act) 100 but also
create "an allowance for growth" (as envisioned by section 173
(1)(B))_.107
In effect, this proposal represents a hybridization of the two
alternate schemes authorized by Congress. The current EPA ruling
interprets "reasonable further progress" as requiring that an emis-
sion trade-off yield a better than one-for-one improvement.0 s So,
for example, a SIP could stipulate that the ratio of actual emission
reductions to new emissions must be at least 1.1:1 for certain pol-
lutants. To create ten tons per year of bankable offsets, then, a
source in that area must reduce its emissions by eleven tons per
year. Because states have substantial discretion in setting the ap-
plicable ratio, 10 9 the appropriate authority could instead apply a
1.3:1 ratio, thus requiring an operator to exchange thirteen tons of
reduction for ten tons of offset, enabling the state to set aside two
tons of emissions in a publicly owned bank account. Using such
reserves, the local authority could undercut high market prices and
thereby curb speculation. The fund could also be made available
to new industries as an incentive to settle in the area. 10
B. The Patent Model
Another fruitful approach is to consider other types of property
rights recognized by law which combine incidents of both public
and private ownership. For example, patents are designed in part
to encourage inventions by granting a temporary monopoly to the
inventor."" Analogizing the creation of an offset to an invention,
government authorities might grant to the parent source a patent-
like right to the exclusive use of its offsets 112 for a certain period of
years," 3 after which any remainder of unused offsets would revert
106 Clean Air Act §173(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §7503(1)(A) (Supp. 1 1977).
107 Id. § 173(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(B) (Supp. 11977).
108 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,285; see J. QuAIIL.s, supra note 12,
at 74.
109 1979 Offset Ruling, supra note 7, at 3,285; see J. QuTArus, supra note 12,
at 74.
110 See note 104 supra.
"'I E.g., P. AP= EEA, ANT=rUST ANALYss 425-29 (2d ed. 1974).
112 For the structure of the patent system, see the patent statute itself, 35
U.S.C. §§ 100-293 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
113 Patents are granted for a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1976). Pennsylvania has, in effect, adopted the patent model for its banking
system. Its new regulations provide that banked offsets "may only be used as
offset credit by the applicant in a plan approval application filed within a period
of five years" after their creation. PA. CODE tit. 25, pt. I, § 127.67(a) (1979).
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to the public domain. Such a system would permit the "patentee"
to assign freely its unused offsets to another source 114 and perhaps
return a profit on its original pollution-cutting investment. Private
incentives to overcontrol would be preserved and market forces
allowed to operate, while at the same time the eventual expiration
of the "patent" would exert pressure on the parent source to use or
dispose of the offset productively within a reasonable amount of
time, thus averting the economic stagnation that may exist if parent
sources bank their offsets indefinitely. Moreover, limited duration
promotes the technology-forcing strategy underlying the Clean Air
Act:"" by assuring that sources will be motivated to continue the
search for pollution-cutting measures.
The patent model is not, however, foolproof. The grant of an
absolute property right in offsets for a term of years does not pre-
clude anticompetitive behavior by firms which might discriminate
unfairly among customers or at least obtain short-term monopoly
power by stockpiling most of the available offsets in a local
market.116 Correction of such abuses would depend, as it does in
the patent area, on the enforcement of antitrust laws,"17 with all the
accompanying uncertainties and expenses.1" From the viewpoint
of a source operator, on the other hand, the possibility of unused
offsets expiring may temper its willingness to produce current emis-
sion reductions unless a specific need or buyer for them is antici-
314 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976) (patent statute).
115 See Note, supra note 48.
116 Frustration at perceived abuses and maldistribution in the patent system
have sometimes generated government attention and suggestions for reform. One
such initiative proposed:
In order to eliminate the use of patents in ways inimical to the public
policy inherent in the patent laws, as well as that of the antitrust laws,
we recommend that the Congress enact legislation which will require that
any future patent is to be available for use by anyone who may desire its
use and who is willing to pay a fair price for the privilege. Machinery,
either judicial or administrative, should be set up to determine whether
the royalty demanded by the patentee may fairly be said to represent
reasonable compensation or is intended to set a prohibitive price for such
use.
FMNAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE TEML'ORARY EcoN. Com'N., S. Doc.
No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1941), quoted in L. ScnwATz & J. FrYN,x,
ANTrr UsT AND REIGuLATORY ALTERNATIVES 1226 (5th ed. 1977).
It is worth noting, too, that the drafters of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 specifically considered the potentially harmful impact of a patent system on
its technology-forcing strategy and determined that an exception to the patent laws
was required. Provision was made for compulsory licensing of patents on pollution-
control devices, despite the effect this had of removing incentives to invent such
devices. See Clean Air Act § 308, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (Supp. I 1977).
117 See L. SuxIavAN, supra note 85, at § 179.
118 See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
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pated in the foreseeable future. To some extent, then, the incentive
for early pollution reduction, which the banking policy was de-
signed to instill," 9 would be undermined.
C. The License Model
Another legal analogue, even more promising than patents, is
licensing. Rather than vesting any property right in the holder, a
license is merely a grant of permission "to do a thing which the
licensor could prevent." 120 As such, conditions on its use may be
attached and failure to comply with them can be punished by revo-
cation.' 2 ' By limiting the duration of a license to a fixed period
while holding open the possibility of successive renewals, the inter-
ests of the regulator and the operator may, as much as possible,
be balanced.
The most conspicuous example of large-scale government licens-
ing is broadcasting, in which the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the licensing of
radio and television operators. 122 The scarcity of a valuable re-
source-available air frequencies-and the need to ensure that they
were used responsibly persuaded Congress not to grant property
rights to broadcasters despite their enormous private capital invest-
ment, but instead to issue licenses for short, three-year terms.
2 3
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 obligates the FCC to en-
sure that, in extending licenses to broadcasters, the "public con-
venience, interest, or necessity will be served." 124 Although in
practice this duty may be paid only lip service 1-25 and does not
119 See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
12oBLAcK's LAw DicToNARY 829 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Western Elec. Co. v.
Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1930)).
121 For an example of such conditions and penalties in the federal communica-
tions laws, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(f), 312 (1976).
3
2 2 As its illustration of nonprice allocation of inherently scarce resources, one
general casebook considers FCC licensing in depth. See T. MoGAcN, supra note
102, at 119-52 (1976).
123 Section 301 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 reads:
It is the purpose of this chapter ... to maintain the control of the United
States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission;
and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof,
by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal
authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right,
beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
124 Id. § 307(a).
12
5 See generally B. Cor & M. OETmrER, Earuc-rTA RGu' &Tons: THE
FCC A ND= BRoADCAs-r AUDmNCE 134, 177 (1978).
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preclude operators from making profits by use or sale of the license,
at least the legal principle has been established that no property
right inheres in a broadcast license, 126 and that it may be closely
regulated127 or even revoked, at least for "good cause." 128
Communications law thus provides a good example of an ac-
commodation between the need to make economic use of a scarce
valuable resource and the need to protect the public interest in
that resource. Because of the great value placed on clean air, the
emission-offset policy requires this type of accommodation.
Under such a system, when a source reduces its pollution below
the required SIP level, the appropriate state agency would issue it
a license to offset an almost equivalent increase in emissions caused
by new construction or expansion of facilities. The license would
entitle the holder itself to consume these offsets or sell them for
profit to another source within a fixed term of years,'129 subject to
revocation at any time for abuse inconsistent with the public inter-
est. During this time the state would be restrained from reducing
the "amount" of offsets by revising the SIP baseline, 130 so both
buyers and sellers could deal with greater certainty and foresight.
The producer of offsets who is unable to use or sell the privilege
within the allotted time could seek to have the privilege renewed
for another term, but, at this stage, the appropriate state agency
could exercise its statutory authority '31 to revise SIP limits down-
ward (thereby erasing the offsets) and adjust the mix of allowable
pollutants, if necessary, to meet unforeseen delays in attainment.
In this way a compromise is struck between business's desire for
predictable SIP baselines and the public's interest in retaining some
control over SIP to meet future contingencies. 132
Advocates of a more active governmental role in offset alloca-
tion might wish to give states even more flexibility at the renewal
stage by authorizing them to channel "expired" offsets directly to
necessary pending projects which are stalled for lack of needed off-
12647 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326
U.S. 327 (1945).
12 7 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
128 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 805
(1978).
129 The maximum length of time fixed by Pennsylvania for banking of offsets
under its proposed scheme is five years. See note 113 supra.
130 For discussion of the purposes and effects of changing the SIP baseline,
see text accompanying notes 73-82 supra.
13iClean Air Act §110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(H) (Supp. I
1977).
1
3 2 See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
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sets. Under this view, the agency would insist upon a transfer,
negotiate a fair monetary settlement between the parties, and
thereby "free up" offsets to meet a public need. In addition to the
difficulty of choosing among competing applicants, especially when
an incumbent claims a presumptive right or a renewal expectancy, 33
however, too many forced transfers would undermine the trading
in offsets on the open market. Purchasers would wait and apply
for expired offsets at a government-set price rather than at the price
which free competition on the open market might have generated.
Objections to this procedure are apt to arise among those who stress
the ability of the market to allocate optimally offsets 134 and stimu-
late conservation measures by the lure of high profits.135
A preferable renewal process would have the public authority
insist that all expired licenses be auctioned to the highest bidder. 3 6
If the parent source wishes to retain its offsets, it will have to pay
the going rate to renew them. The difference between the price
paid and the parent's original cost of producing the offsets would
go to the state to help defray the costs of regulation. If, on the
other hand, another enterprise places greater value on the offsets,
the parent may drop out of the competition and make a profit.
Such a procedure simultaneously permits market price to allo-
cate offsets free of government interference and has the positive
133 Such decisions to reallocate offset privileges need not be completely arbi-
trary or discretionary; authorities could promulgate stated criteria and compare
competing applicants on the basis of objective social, employment, or tax-based
factors. Preference could be given, for example, to the construction or modification
which would likely create the most jobs. See Comment, supra note 1, at 595-96.
In the absence of such concrete criteria, an agency's decision not to renew an
incumbent's license to offset might provoke legal challenges. The experience of the
FCC in broadcast licensing suggests that when objective criteria are lacking, com-
parative licensing hearings are infeasible, see Anthony, Towards Simplicity and
Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1,
3-4 (1971), and if renewal becomes the norm, then "a 'legitimate renewal ex-
pectanc[y]"' may arise which "should not be destroyed absent good cause." FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 805 (1978) (quoting
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)). But see Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC,
598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979) (remand for failure
to articulate basis of decision to renew license). Because construction proposals
may be compared more objectively than the content of broadcast programs and do
not raise first-amendment considerations, the reluctance of the FCC to deny license
renewals might not be duplicated in the context of offset allocation.
134 See T. MoRcA, supra note 102, at 118.
135 See Comment, supra note 1, at 598.
136 See T. MortGAN, supra note 102, at 118 ("If one views the sum a potential
user would bid as a measure of the value to him or of the productive use he can
make of the resources, then it follows that an auction technique would tend to
allocate the scarce resources to the most valuable or productive uses.").
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effect of forcing the sources to meet the current market value of
the offsets, thus making them pay some of the "cost" of holding the
offset privileges idle. Each time an offset expires and is repurchased
by the owner, the owner's "basis" in the offset would be increased
to the new purchase price; in this way, an owner would be assessed
only for the value increase in his offset since the previous renewal. 37
With the revenues obtained from the resale of licenses to their
original holders, state agencies could occasionally enter the market
for offsets and purchase them for use in various community-benefit
projects.
As a means of preventing anticompetitive behavior in the offset
market, the license model also offers advantages over the private-
property concept. Rather than having to rely on the case-by-case
enforcement of antitrust law to curb monopolistic practices or
patterns in the offset market, the states could easily fix upper limits
on the amount of offsets licensed to any single source in much the
same way that the FCC has averted further concentration of owner-
ship in the media by restricting the number of licenses and news-
papers that can be jointly owned.138 Indeed, this FCC experience
suggests that regulation of entry may justify collateral regulation of
broadcaster behavior under a public-interest standard; thus, reason-
able rules might be applied to the trading and use of offsets as
prophylactic measures. 1 9 The threat of having offsets revoked
could also serve as a useful enforcement tool to ensure owners' on-
going compliance with restrictions on their already existing sources.
137 To illustrate, assume that X installs a controlling device and produces offsets
at a cost of $100 in year 1, whereupon he is issued a five-year license. In order to
renew it in year 5, X must outbid several competitors. The final purchase price is
$150, but rather than force X to pay the investment cost of his offsets twice, his
out-of-pocket payment in year 5 is only $50, the difference between original cost,
$100, and current market value, $150, which goes to the state. By year 10 the
value of X's offsets has increased so that they are now worth $250 on the open
market. Again X wishes to retain them, so he outbids other buyers and the license
is reissued to him for $250. Again, in recognition of the private investment which
originally created these offsets and to encourage such voluntary offset production,
X is charged only the $100 by which his offsets have appreciated since the last
renewal. When X's license next expires in year 15, holding onto them is no longer
worth as much to X as using them is worth to Y. The latter wins the bidding by
offering to pay $500, which goes to X for a net profit of $250 ($500 (sale price to
Y) less the sum of $100 (cost to X in year 1) plus $50 (amount paid to state in
year 5 to renew license) plus $100 (amount paid to state in year 10 to renew
license) ).
138 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, & 73.636 (1979), upheld in FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
139 The FCC has thus, as an extension of its licensing power, promulgated
countless rules regulating the trading and use of, for example, television stations.
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910-.1930 (1979) (fairness doctrine concerning personal
attacks and political editorials); id. § 73.659 (example of regulation of sale of
station).
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CONCLUSION
The importance of a workable environmental policy is clear.
Such a policy is difficult to obtain, however, because it necessitates
a balancing of two legitimate, conflicting interests-protection of
the environment and the need for private business to be free from
overly burdensome regulation. The emission-offset policy repre-
sents a largely successful effort at accommodating these interests.
As originally designed, without banking, the offset policy was aimed
at encouraging immediate use of offsets in order to ameliorate the
economic stagnation that private business had complained was re-
sulting from excessive environmental regulation. With the adop-
tion of offset banking, expansion and construction of new facilities
became still more feasible without sacrificing ultimate attainment
of clean air.
The banking policy itself, however, leads to another public-
private conflict with respect to actual ownership of the offsets.
Purely private ownership permits businesses to bank offsets for
lengthy periods of time, thereby withholding them from productive
use and creating a speculative market in offsets that artificially raises
their price. In addition, antitrust problems are likely to arise in
such a market. On the other hand, purely public ownership of
offsets removes all incentives for businesses to reduce emissions be-
yond what is required by law. Further, allocation of offsets would
have to be determined by potentially cumbersome administrative
processes rather than by market forces.
This Comment has proposed several alternative solutions to
this ownership problem. Although a system of state acquisition and
sale of offsets and another model based on the patent system have
some attractive features, the most promising proposal involves a
licensing system. This method, analogous to regulation of broad-
casting, would allow private business to reap profits from its invest-
ments while forcing it to assume the cost of holding unused offsets
by bidding on the open market to renew its licenses for offsets.
Thus, licensing strikes a proper balance between environmental and
business interests and offers hope for reducing pollution while con-
tributing to economic vitality.
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